"Organic Happiness" versus "the vale of Soul-making" : Changing Attitudes towards the Struggle for Existence in the Romantic Age by Koguchi, Ichiro
Osaka University
Title
"Organic Happiness" versus "the vale of Soul-making" :
Changing Attitudes towards the Struggle for Existence in the
Romantic Age
Author(s)Koguchi, Ichiro
Citation言語文化研究. 36 P.185-P.200
Issue Date2010-03
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/5330
DOI
Rights
“Organic Happiness” versus “the vale of Soul-making” 185
“Organic Happiness” versus “the vale of Soul-making”: 
Changing Attitudes towards the Struggle for Existence
in the Romantic Age
　　
Ichiro Koguchi
　進化論における「生存競争」と「自然淘汰」は文学的テーマでもある。これらの概念は、
Charles Darwinが科学用語として確立する前から、西欧文学にたびたび登場している。18世
紀を代表する詩人であり、進化論の提唱者でもあったErasmus Darwin、そして19世紀初頭の
ロマン主義詩人であるJohn Keatsは、食物連鎖を扱う詩的イメージの中でこれらの概念に明
確に言及している。しかし、彼らが「生存競争」や「自然淘汰」に向けるそれぞれのまな
ざしは根本的に異なる。本論文では、ダーウィンのThe Temple of Nature、そしてキーツの“To. 
J. H. Reynolds, Esq.”、The Fall of Hyperion、さらに手紙における発言などを考察することに
よって、調和した全体的システムの中に生存競争の痛みと死を吸収し、無化しようとする
ダーウィンの傾向と、生存競争の残酷さを認めつつ、あくまでも個々の主体において救済
を求めようとするキーツの感受性の違いを明らかにする。さらに、この対立する詩的態度に、
18世紀からロマン主義へと流れる、精神のありかたの時代的変遷を読みとる。
Keywords: struggle for existence, evolutionism, Romantic individualism
Ⅰ
　“To J. H. Reynolds, Esq.” may not be among John Keats’s finest works, but this verse epistle 
can nonetheless be recognised as quintessentially Keatsian. We observe in it some of the most 
significant issues that concerned the poet during his brief poetic career. Vision and reality, life and 
art, and the functions of poetic imagination—Keats speculates on these themes in the poem and 
endeavours to find an artistic perspective for them. Earlier studies have found that some of the 
important aspects of the poem, together with specific imagery and wording, developed into more 
mature poetic expressions in such later works as “Ode to a Nightingale” and “Ode on a Grecian 
Urn” (Visick; Gérard 215-36). “To J. H. Reynolds, Esq.” can be regarded as a seminal work that 
anticipates Keats in his finest artistic phase.
　A poet who died young of degenerative disease, Keats in his final years was haunted by the idea 
of mortality. Indeed, the idea dominates the ending part of “To J. H. Reynolds, Esq.” and serves to 
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set the poem’s tone of anxiousness and uncertainty. In his other poems and in his letters, too, the 
poet writes on human mortality, but here he expands his scope. He contemplates the cruel predation 
inherent in the food chain, in which stronger creatures feed on the weaker. The poem, in short, 
strongly concerns itself with such issues as mortality, suffering and evil by taking up the struggle 
for existence in the natural world.
　Keats’s attitude towards these notions can be illuminated by comparing it with that of Erasmus 
Darwin. In his poem The Temple of Nature, Darwin deals with these same issues, but the views of 
Keats and Darwin are quite contrastive. While the younger poet is deeply distressed by the death 
and suffering of victims in the food chain, the older calmly accepts these facts and puts forward a 
world-view in which mortality and evil are ultimately offset by ever-increasing happiness. Keats 
sympathises with individual creatures crushed under the cruel reality of nature, but Darwin, in 
contrast, looks at nature as a totality and considers that the problem of mortality and individual 
suffering can be subsumed and nullified in this holistic system.
　This disparity in attitude may be ascribed to the dissimilar personalities of the two poets. 
However, more significantly, the difference can also be due to the changing climate of thought 
around the Romantic age. Darwin lived from 1731 to 1802, and Keats, from 1795 to 1821. A rather 
drastic shift in attitude towards mortality, suffering and evil might have been occurring around 
the turn of the nineteenth century, and this could have been behind the contrastive views of those 
two poets. In this paper, I shall clarify the nature of this difference with reference to the contextual 
change in thought and sensibility occurring from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century.
　The idea of the struggle for existence is the main focus of my discussion. This may be a favourite 
topic for humanities studies focusing on the mid nineteenth century and later, but it does not 
seem to be a popular subject in Romantic studies. “To J. H. Reynolds, Esq.” was once scrutinised 
by Hoxie N. Fairchild in terms of the Western concept of the struggle for existence. Pursuant to 
his aim, Fairchild concentrated on shared features of Keats and other literary thinkers including 
Erasmus Darwin. The uniqueness of Keats and the difference of Romantic thinking from that of 
other ages, however, are largely left untouched by Fairchild. A possible influence of Darwin’s 
biological treatise Zoonomia on Keats’s verse epistle was hinted by Donald M. Hassler (109), 
but he stopped short of discussing it. The present paper is intended to complement earlier critical 
studies by examining how Keats deviates from Darwin’s eighteenth-century formulation of the idea 
of the struggle for existence. Hopefully, this approach can contribute to a better understanding of 
Keats’s uniqueness and the characteristics of British Romanticism.
　I shall start with a brief comparison of Keats and Darwin by quoting lines from “To J. H. 
Reynolds, Esq.” and from The Temple of Nature. I shall then investigate Darwin’s view of the 
struggle for existence in greater detail, referring to The Temple of Nature as well as some of his 
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prose treatises. A particular emphasis will be laid on Darwin’s view of religious salvation, which 
claims that terrestrial ills will ultimately be cancelled out by the benevolent system of nature. 
Additionally, I shall discuss eighteenth-century optimism and evolutionism in relation to his 
thought on salvation. After Darwin, I shall proceed to Keats, intending to indicate how Darwin’s 
redemptive perspective was no longer valid for the younger poet. Keats’s concept of “the vale of 
Soul-making” will then be examined in order to bring to light his own system of salvation, which, 
unlike Darwin’s, prioritises the personal experience of individual human beings. For supporting 
evidence, I shall discuss a similar vision of redemption that Keats developed in his two Hyperion 
epics.
　In the concluding section, I shall offer a brief look at Alfred Tennyson’s famous line “Nature, red 
in tooth and claw” from In Memoriam and John Clare’s nature poetry. The former is a Victorian 
attempt to face the cruelty of the natural world largely in a Keatsian manner, and the latter shows a 
more objective, more serene perspective to deal with the same problem. In Clare we might read an 
alternative view, which is more readily acceptable in the secular cultural milieu of our present time.
Ⅱ
　On 25 March 1818, John Keats wrote a verse letter to his friend John Hamilton Reynolds. After 
writing about poetic imagery, Claude Lorrain’s painting, dreams and illusions, in the closing 
section, he begins rather abruptly to speculate on distressful scenes in nature:
    . . . I saw 
 Too far into the sea—where every maw 
 The greater on the less feeds evermore . . . 
 But I saw too distinct into the core 
 Of an eternal fierce destruction. . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 Still do I that most fierce destruction see: 
 The shark at savage prey, the hawk at pounce, 
 The gentle robin, like a pard or ounce,
 Ravening a worm. . . . (93-97, 102-05)
Keats in these lines is remarkably sensitive to the cruelty of the food chain. His distress is visible 
in the repetition of the strong phrase, “fierce destruction.” He makes this emotional response more 
explicit in the same poem:
    It is a flaw 
 In happiness to see beyond our bourn— 
 It forces us in summer skies to mourn; 
 It spoils the singing of the nightingale. (82-85)
The poet sympathised so strongly with the victims of nature’s economy that, when he meditated on 
these scenes, he was feeling far removed from happiness (98), and later, while composing poetical 
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lines on them, he was still “sick of it” (99) and in “horrid moods” (105).
　His sensitivity to the cruelty of predation is not surprising. Indeed, thoughts of mortality were 
constantly on his mind. When he was writing the above passages, he was at the bedside of his 
terminally ill brother, Tom. Keats had also lost his parents and several of his friends and relatives 
by 1818. Further, as Marilyn Gaull explains, death and mortality were felt particularly strongly in 
the Romantic age; political upheavals, poor harvests and inadequate attention to hygiene, as well 
as frequent newspaper reports on tragic incidents, made death a familiar fact of life (218-19). It 
was perhaps natural that Keats should be haunted by the idea of mortality, human or otherwise, and 
should compose upon this theme.
　If we place Keats beside Erasmus Darwin, however, we find a somewhat different perspective for 
looking at this verse epistle. Preoccupation with death and suffering is not unique to Keats or to the 
sensibility of the Romantic age. It is, rather, a development of a tradition rooted in Western culture. 
In the fourth canto of The Temple of Nature (1803), Darwin writes lines closely resembling Keats’s 
in theme and imagery:
 　　 The wolf, escorted by his milk-drawn dam, 
 Unknown to mercy, tears the guiltless lamb; 
 The towering eagle, darting from above, 
 Unfeeling rends the inoffensive dove; 
 The lamb and dove on living nature feed, 
 Crop the young herb, or crush the embryon seed. 
 Nor spares the loud owl in her dusky flight, 
 Smit with sweet notes, the minstrel of the night; 
 Nor spares enamour’d of his radiant form, 
 The hungry nightingale the glowing worm; 
 Who with bright lamp alarms the midnight hour, 
 Climbs the green stem, and slays the sleeping flower. (4. 17-28)
Darwin’s perspective is more extensive than Keats’s. But both poets take up the same subject 
matter, and both refer to raptors and smaller birds as predators, and to worms as preys. The next 
quotation from Darwin describes aquatic creatures like Keats’s shark:
  The shark rapacious with descending blow 
 Darts on the scaly brood, that swims below; 
 The crawling crocodiles, beneath that move, 
 Arrest with rising jaw the tribes above; 
 With monstrous gape sepulchral whales devour 
 Shoals at a gulp, a million in an hour. (4. 57-62)
As demonstrated by Fairchild, representing the struggle for existence in poetry is an established 
tradition, and Darwin and Keats clearly subscribe to it (111-12).
　Nevertheless, differences between The Temple of Nature and Keats’s verse epistle are notable. 
In contrast to Keats’s emotional response to cruel scenes in the food chain, Darwin’s attitude is 
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that of a detached observer. Keats feels deep distress through emotional identification with the 
victims of the struggle for existence. But Darwin, facing similar sights, seems to be content with 
allegorical abstraction: “In ocean’s pearly haunts, the waves beneath / Sits the grim monarch of 
insatiate Death” (4. 55-56). Although seemingly struck by “One scene of blood, one mighty tomb” 
(4. 64), his feelings are not seriously threatened by creatures’ suffering or death. While Keats was 
overwhelmed by emotions and stopped writing after composing merely twenty lines on nature’s 
cruelty, Darwin calmly went on describing the same struggle. He even narrates the “vegetable war” 
(Temple of Nature 4. 42), or competition for nutrition and sunlight among plants.
　The disparity in the two poets’ mindset is curious, considering they were near contemporaries. 
The next section will discuss Darwin’s view of suffering and mortality, aiming to find philosophical 
principles that supported his attitude.
Ⅲ
　Like his grandson Charles, Erasmus Darwin was a proponent of biological evolution; his theory 
is extensively set out in The Temple of Nature. According to the elder Darwin, the birth of organic 
beings was in the primeval ocean:
  Organic Life beneath the shoreless waves 
 Was born and nurs’d in Ocean’s pearly caves; 
 First forms minute, unseen by spheric glass, 
 Move on the mud, or pierce the watery mass; 
 These, as successive generations bloom, 
 New powers acquire, and larger limbs assume; 
 Whence countless groups of vegetation spring, 
 And breathing realms of fin, and feet, and wing. (1. 295-302)
All organisms, including mankind, originated from the same primeval being, as Darwin says that “the 
tall Oak” (1. 303), “The Whale” (1. 305), “The lordly Lion” (1. 306), “The Eagle” (1. 307) and “man” 
(1. 309), all “Arose from rudiments of form and sense, / An embryon point, or microscopic ens” (1. 
313-14).
　Although, unlike his grandson, Darwin does not use the phrase “struggle for existence” or “natural 
selection,” these ideas are tacit but important assumptions in his theory. In Zoonomia, he claims 
that desire is the cause of the transformations of living things. There he subdivides desire into three 
categories: “lust, hunger, and [desire for] security” (1. 503). These three kinds of desire drive the 
gradual process of biological progress, and natural selection is implied in the operation of these 
desires.
　In The Temple of Nature, the role of sexual desire, or “lust,” is prominent in evolution, for 
the poem states that improvement of species results partly from hetero-sexual reproduction. At 
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the initial stages of evolution, asexual reproduction is the only means of producing offspring: 
“Unknown to sex the pregnant oyster swells, / And coral-insects build their radiate shells” (2. 89-
90). But this form of reproduction necessarily entails “hereditary ills” (2. 164) and “feeble births” 
(2. 165). Finally, “Death extinguish[es] the degenerate race” (2. 166). Hence in many species, it 
is eventually replaced by sexual reproduction. Heterosexuality, thus introduced, is accompanied 
by what Desmond King-Hele calls “sexual selection” (299). In Zoonomia, Darwin holds that the 
males of some species combat each other for “exclusive possession of the females” (1. 503), with 
the outcome that “the strongest and most active animal should propagate the species, which should 
thence become improved” (1. 503). This is not a far cry from the concepts of natural selection and 
the struggle for existence.
　Similarly, hunger and desire for security drive the process of evolution. Hunger, according to 
Zoonomia, “has diversified the forms of all species of animals” (1. 503) by making them adapt to 
the specific kinds of foods they consume. These diverse forms include the hardened nose of the 
swine, the trunk of the elephant, the rough tongue and palate of cattle, and the various shapes of 
birds’ beaks (1. 503). Desire for security has varied the outward shapes and colours of creatures to 
elude enemies: birds’ wings and tortoises’ shells are examples (1. 504). The ideas of the struggle 
for existence and natural selection are thus implied in Darwin’s view of evolution. It is hardly 
surprising that he should recount in detail the ruthless processes of the natural food chain in his 
poetry. In this sense, nature can be rightly called “one great Slaughter-house” (Temple of Nature 4. 
66).
　However, this pessimistic picture is only half-truth. Darwin has ultimately concluded that 
despite localised ills and sufferings, the world as a whole will eventually be filled with bliss. The 
misery of mortality and pain is destined to be overpowered and cancelled out by pleasure and 
happiness. Along with the notion of the struggle for existence, this optimistic view is inherent in his 
evolutionary theory.
　Darwin believes that the sum total of happiness does not diminish even by the death and suffering 
that living organisms undergo. He is convinced that death is not merely an evil but also a change of 
form that promises good for the rising generation. After organisms die, the matter that composed 
their bodies is handed down to following generations:
 　　 . . . when a Monarch or a mushroom dies, 
 Awhile extinct the organic matter lies; 
 But, as a few short hours or years revolve, 
 Alchemic powers the changing mass dissolve; 
 Born to new life unnumber’d insects pant, 
 New buds surround the microscopic plant. (Temple of Nature 4. 383-88)
By such processes, “Renascent joys” (4. 391) emerge in newly born insects and buds. This means 
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that the happiness felt by a generation of living things is inherited by their offspring:
  Emerging matter from the grave returns, 
 Feels new desires, with new sensations burns; 
 With youth’s first bloom a finer sense acquires, 
 And Loves and Pleasures fan the rising fires.— (4. 399-402)
　The total amount of joy and happiness does not merely remain the same, Darwin asserts, but it 
is ever on the increase (Footnote to 4. 410). This is probably because the population of organisms 
becomes successively larger, and the amount of happiness increases correspondingly. He observes 
that species are surprisingly prolific (4. 347-65), and they are “increasing by successive birth” (4. 
377) until they “o’erpeople ocean, air, and earth” (4. 378). This increase in the happiness of organic 
beings is also because of the mechanism intrinsic in the conversion of organic matter from older to 
newer generations. As newborns can take nutrients directly from the organic remains of previous 
generations, which are easier to digest and more nutritious than inorganic substances, the living 
power of freshly born organisms becomes greater:
  . . . as those remains of former life are not again totally decomposed, or converted into 
their original elements, they supply more copious food . . . which consists of materials 
convertible into nutriment with less labour or activity of the digestive powers; and hence 
the quantity or number of organized bodies, and their improvement in size, as well as their 
happiness, has been continually increasing. . . . (Footnote to 4. 453)
　In addition, the process of natural selection itself augments the amount of happiness. In 
Phytologia, a treatise on plants, Darwin admits that nature seems to be dominated by the “Eat or be 
eaten” principle (556). But despite this apparent mercilessness, he argues that this world proves to 
be benevolent if we adopt a more comprehensive perspective:
  By this contrivance [the food chain in nature] more pleasurable sensation exists in the 
world, as the organized matter is taken from a state of less irritability and less sensibility, 
and converted into a state of greater. (557) 
More active and more highly sentient creatures, which are more likely to survive in the course of 
evolution, have a greater capacity for pleasure. The evolutionary struggle for existence maximises 
the total amount of pleasure and happiness.
　Darwin, through this theorising, redefines his own idea of nature. The natural world, a large 
proportion of which is made of the remains of organic life, is now considered “A Mighty 
Monuments of Past Delight” (4. 450). With this world picture in which happiness is ever increasing, 
he goes so far as to advance a vision of redemption: death is “vanquish’d,” “Happiness survives,” 
“Life increasing peoples every clime,” and “young Renascent Nature conquers Time” (4. 452, 453, 
454).
　It should be noted that in Darwin’s redemptive view, individual lives are not foregrounded. 
His attention is drawn to nature as a totality and to the sum total of happiness in the whole world. 
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Individual beings’ mortality and their existential fear are not highlighted, let alone the suffering that 
each creature is subjected to. This attitude is typical of eighteenth-century optimism as defined by 
Arthur O. Lovejoy.
　Optimism is one of the characteristics of eighteenth-century thinking; as a philosophical 
doctrine, it signifies more than hopefulness for the future. According to Lovejoy, eighteenth-century 
optimism holds that the world as it is exists in the best of metaphysically possible states. But, 
curiously, this view implies neither the happiness nor the excellence of individual parts of the whole 
system. The perfection of the whole, on the contrary, consists in the existence of every possible 
degree of imperfection in the parts (Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being 208, 211). Soame Jennyns, an 
eighteenth-century thinker, denying a perfect whole built on the perfection of its parts, claims that 
“the sufferings of individuals are absolutely necessary to universal happiness” (89). The following 
extract from William King neatly summarises the eighteenth-century effort to harmonise God’s 
infinite goodness, the benevolence of nature and local evils in the actual world:
  [God’s] infinite goodness . . . obliged him to produce external things; which things, since 
they could not possibly be perfect, the divine goodness preferred imperfect ones to none 
at all. Imperfection then arose from the infinity of divine goodness. (82)
　Given such features of optimism, it seems reasonable to regard Darwin’s position as a version 
of this eighteenth-century thought. Darwin pays attention to creatures’ mortality and the pains that 
they are destined to suffer; however, like his optimist predecessors, he subsumes these local ills in 
a broader system. For Jenyns and King, this system is benevolent nature and divine goodness; for 
Darwin it is biological evolution and the larger scheme of redemption in which the joys of life will 
eventually prevail.
　In contrast to popular usage, optimism is a static concept. It considers the present state of the 
world as the best possible; it does not necessarily mean confidence about the future. Onto this static 
concept, Darwin grafted the temporal principle of biological evolution.
Ⅳ
　We have seen that the lines describing the struggle for existence in The Temple of Nature 
resemble the concluding part of Keats’s “To J. H. Reynolds, Esq.” The resemblance is so notable 
that Donald Hassler speculates on Darwin’s direct influence on Keats (109). Indeed, Darwin was 
one of the most highly appreciated poets of his age (King-Hele 237-40), and Keats mentioned 
Darwin, although dismissively, in one of his letters (Letters 1. 113). It must have been difficult for 
any young poet of Keats’s time to ignore this older poet. The medical profession, in which both 
poets were engaged, is another possible link.
　However, the difference in attitude between these two poets is more striking than their similarity. 
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As discussed above, suffering and death amid the struggle for existence are justified in Darwin’s 
thinking by the concept of the ever-increasing happiness of organic life. Individual pain and death 
are minor elements in this overall scheme. But Keats clearly rejected this view. For him, suffering 
and mortality are personal issues. The total amount of happiness in the world can never offset such 
tragic feelings as he had while meditating on the cruelty of the food chain. Keats needed to find 
a way to justify mortality and evil at a personal and emotional level. Otherwise the reality of the 
world would only cause him anxiety and despair: “from happiness I far was gone. / Still am I sick 
of it” (“To J. H. Reynolds, Esq.” 98-99).
　Keats’s endeavour to cope with this problem led to the conception of “the vale of Soul-making” 
(Letters 2. 102). Here he puts forward a system of salvation, which is at significant variance with 
Darwin’s idea of the happiness of organic life. Whereas the older poet is interested in the world as 
a whole, Keats is exclusively concerned with how each human being can be saved. The “vale of 
Soul-making” also appears to differ from Darwin’s thinking in that Keats focuses on humans, not 
living things in general. However, he elsewhere treats the human being and other animals, such as 
“the Hawk,” “the Robin” and “the Lion” (2. 79), in the same perspective (Fairchild 102). He also 
emphasises that the human being is “subject to the same mischances as the beasts of the forest” 
(Letters 2. 101). Hence the poet probably thought that, as a participant in the struggle for existence, 
the human being need not be discriminated from other creatures.
　In “the vale of Soul-making,” Keats is determined to reject the traditional idea of the world as 
“a vale of tears” (Letters 2. 101). Instead, he reconsiders it as a place for each human being to 
become a truly individual, conscious existence, or a “soul.” Three “Materials” are necessary for this 
soul-making: “the Intelligence,” “the human heart,” and “the World or Elemental space” (2. 102). 
Intelligences, according to Keats, are “sparks of the divinity” (2. 102); the intelligence can thus be 
regarded as a human being’s inchoate consciousness, the ultimate origin of which is in the spiritual 
or divine realm. An intelligence becomes a soul only when it can be “personally itself” (2. 102), 
i.e., when it can acquire its own identity. The “World” is “a School” (2. 102) for the intelligence, 
and the “human heart” is “the horn Book used in that School” (2. 102). Keats’s system of soul-
making seems to signify that each intelligence acquires its personal identity so as to become a soul 
by gaining experiences in the world. The human heart, endowed with feeling and perception, is the 
medium of this learning process. Since Keats considers the world full of misery, it follows that “a 
World of Pains and troubles” is necessary “to school an Intelligence and make it a soul” (2. 102).
　Keats does not elaborate specifically how his concept of soul-making brings salvation. He 
only hints that a spiritual joy, or “a bliss peculiar to each ones individual existence” (2. 102), 
can be attained when an intelligence becomes a soul. But his real point is probably elsewhere. 
Considering the great emphasis he places on the process of soul-making, it is most probable that, in 
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his system, the attainment of the state of soul is itself a salvation. When embryonic consciousness 
has developed into an individual soul, it is saved. Salvation for Keats, in other words, is the 
establishment of individual identity. Infants, if they die very early, cannot reach the stage of soul-
making. Keats deals with this quandary by having them directly return to God: “In them the Spark 
or intelligence returns to God without any identity” (2. 103).
　This personal salvation myth is in conflict with Darwin’s redemptive scheme. Darwin addresses 
himself to the problem of salvation by annihilating individual sufferings and deaths against the 
larger context of evolution. Keats takes exactly the opposite view. The tragic side of life can in 
no way be absorbed in a larger system. Salvation resides in the process of each human being 
undergoing painful life and becoming personally itself. Individuation is all for Keats.
　The “vale of Soul-making” was written in the spring of 1819. Later in the same year, the poet 
was faced with the same problem of pain and mortality in his famous odes. In these he is acutely 
aware of the mortal nature of humanity and the temporariness of beauty. His answer to the problem 
is “Ode on Melancholy,” in which the highest pleasure lies not in the transcendence of the earthly, 
but in intense contemplation of the ephemeral beauty of the world (Mellor 85). This poem can be 
described as an aesthetic version of “the vale of Soul-making.”
　The theme of soul-making and salvation is again featured in his two epic attempts, Hyperion and 
The Fall of Hyperion. It is known that the structures of these unfinished poems are modelled on 
John Milton’s Paradise Lost (Haworth 638, Sperry). Among the Miltonic features of these poems, 
the concept of felix culpa is probably the most important thematic element. As shown in Lovejoy’s 
classic exposition, Milton’s Paradise Lost is constituted around the paradoxical idea of the “fortunate 
fall” (Lovejoy, Essays in the History of Ideas 277-79). The Fall from the Garden of Eden may be a 
tragic experience, but mankind can regain the height of Paradise in its eventual achievement of the 
New Jerusalem. Hence the Fall is “fortunate” for mankind; it is not merely tragic but a necessary 
step for human redemption. Keats’s two Hyperion epics follow this fundamental pattern.
　In Hyperion, the earlier of the two epic attempts, many of the episodes and characters have 
their counterparts in Paradise Lost. The Titans’ fall from power corresponds with the fall of 
the rebellious angels and that of Adam and Eve; the giant race’s fierce debate reminds us of the 
Pandemonium; Apollo, who experiences a severe ordeal before being deified, is comparable 
to Christ; and as the Titans submit to the new order of the Olympian gods, so Christ’s new law 
supersedes that of Moses (Haworth 641-43).
　The notion of progress is inherent in the idea of the fortunate fall. Hyperion is strongly concerned 
with this notion. Observing the development of human consciousness from the age of Milton to that 
of Wordsworth, Keats, in a letter, declares his trust in the progress of mankind: “the general and 
gregarious advance of intellect” (1. 281), and “a grand march of intellect” (1. 282). The successors 
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of the Titans’ regime, the Olympian gods, are described as “purer life” (2. 211), “fresh perfection” 
(2. 212) and “A power more strong in beauty” (2. 213). In the world where “’tis the eternal law / 
That first in beauty should be first in might” (2. 228-29), it seems only natural that the Olympians 
should dethrone the giant race.
　Interestingly, this idea of progress does not console the defeated Titans. Even after the above 
“eternal law” has been proposed to them, their intense sense of suffering is not lightened. The linear 
development of the whole world, a Darwinian concept, is powerless in the face of their individual 
anguish.
　A hint of redemption is suggested in Apollo’s apotheosis. In the third book, the juvenile Apollo 
is deified by acquiring vast knowledge with the help of the goddess of memory, Mnemosyne. This 
is also a momentous ordeal for the young god; with a sudden influx of knowledge, he is seized 
by a wild commotion and a fierce convulsion. The pain he suffers is like “the struggle at the gate 
of death” (3. 126). Salvation, not allowed to the fallen Titans, is thus partly realised through the 
sudden maturation of Apollo’s mind. In other words, like “the vale of Soul-making,” saving power 
materialises only internally in the growth of individual consciousness. In this sense Keats’s epic is a 
subjective version of Milton’s felix culpa.
　This internal orientation is more evident in the revised version of the poem, The Fall of Hyperion. 
Here the role of Apollo is taken over by the “dreamer,” the narrator of the poem. A mere human 
being, the dreamer himself goes through ordeals and finally, like Apollo, reaches a higher stage of 
recognition.
　The Fall of Hyperion consists of the narrator’s movement through a series of spaces: he first 
comes to a garden surrounded by “trees of every clime” (1. 19); next he finds himself inside a 
stately temple, or “old sanctuary” (1. 62); then, ordered by the goddess Moneta, he ascends the 
stairs of the altar in the temple; and finally he enters the mind of Moneta (Taniuchi). The dreamer’s 
movement is constantly inward: from the open space of the wood, through the inside of the temple, 
and to the ultimate internal dimension, “the dark secret chambers of her [Moneta’s] skull” (1. 275).
　As I mentioned above, this later poem, too, is based on the pattern of felix culpa. Stuart Sperry 
has found convincing evidence that the allegory and structure of Paradise Lost are used in The 
Fall of Hyperion. The first vision of the garden and the copious woods resembles the description 
of Paradise in Milton’s epic. The dreamer eating fruits and losing consciousness can be compared 
to the Fall caused by the same behaviour of Eve. The black gate in the east shut against the sunrise 
is probably based on the portrayal of the eastern gate of Paradise after Adam and Eve have been 
expelled. As Moneta commands the dreamer to ascend the steps of the altar, so the angel Michael 
orders Adam and Eve to climb a hill. The dreamer entreats the goddess to “purge off . . . my mind’s 
film” (1. 145-46), and his request is granted. Likewise Michael removes a film from Adam’s eyes; 
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here Milton, too, uses the word “purged” (Paradise Lost 11. 414). Adam gains a vision from the 
mountain; and like him, Keats’s narrator on the height of the altar acquires “enormous ken, / To 
see as a god sees” (1. 303). The dreamer of The Fall of Hyperion may have committed the sin of 
craving for more-than-human knowledge, but it is an expiable sin, a Miltonic kind of felix culpa 
that brings higher good (Sperry 78-79, 81-83).
　The allegorical structure and the spatial movement of The Fall of Hyperion can be further 
explicated by comparing it to Keats’s theoretical discussion of the growth of human consciousness. 
In one of his letters, the poet compares human life with a “large Mansion of Many Apartments” 
(1. 280). As a human being grows, he passes through rooms in this mansion one by one. Human 
consciousness starts from “the infant or thoughtless Chamber” (1. 280); it then proceeds to “the 
Chamber of Maiden-Thought” (1. 281), which is characterised by bright light and intense pleasure; 
after this chamber has gradually grown dim, the human mind goes on to “dark Passages” (1. 281), 
where, feeling the mystery of life, it still explores its way forward.
　The artistic meaning of this personal allegory has been variously discussed, but attention should 
be drawn to the fact that human consciousness moves into deeper levels and it also goes downward, 
as signified by the increasing dimness of each space. Since human consciousness inevitably 
acquires experience and knowledge while making its way through these dark spaces, implications 
of transgression inhere in the movement of consciousness. The Fall of Hyperion likewise, by 
suggesting a similar process of human development, traces the same inward-downward path. The 
poem’s downward orientation, in accordance with the pattern of the fortunate fall, is thematically 
suggested by the narrator’s act of transgression: his eating fruits and desire for more-than-human 
knowledge.
　However, downward is not the only orientation that the poem takes. Unlike the “Mansion of 
Many Apartments,” which has yet to find signs of redemption, The Fall of Hyperion comprises 
an upward movement and hints of salvation. Before the dreamer is allowed to learn what is inside 
Moneta’s mind, he must ascend the steps of Moneta’s altar. This is an excruciating ordeal. The task 
seems “Prodigious” (1. 121), and even before gaining the lowest step, he is struck by a “palsied 
chill” (1. 122) which threatens to terminate his pulse. He is tormented by “sharp anguish” (1. 126). 
It is not until he steps on the lowest of the stairs that he feels life revive in his body. Only then can 
he mount the stairs. The rewards he is given are the knowledge inside Moneta’s mind, or “What in 
thy brain so ferments to and fro” (1. 290), and “enormous ken / To see as a god sees” (1. 303-04). 
After this point, the story of the Titans fall, recounted already in the first Hyperion, follows.
　In the earlier version, Apollo introduces elements of redemption. In the later, salvation is 
foreshadowed and perhaps partially achieved by the dreamer’s ascent of the altar and the resultant 
semi-apotheosis that enables him to “see as a god sees” (1. 304). If we go back to the issue of pain 
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and mortality and that of their justification in Keats, we understand that The Fall of Hyperion, too, 
is an exploration of the problem that the poet tries to deal with in “the vale of Soul-making.” In the 
pattern of the fortunate fall, the scenes of transgression and extreme anguish are followed by the 
final attainment of a god-like perspective.
　As I stated earlier, The Fall of Hyperion shows an even more strongly internal orientation 
than Hyperion. This is indicated by the importance assigned to the narrator. In Hyperion, the 
story is told objectively by an omniscient narrator whose presence is invisible to the reader. The 
Fall of Hyperion, on the other hand, foregrounds the narrator by imparting to him the role of the 
protagonist of the story. Each scene of the poem is his subjective experience. While Hyperion’s 
crucial moment, the ordeal and deification of Apollo, is recounted from a detached, third-person 
perspective, the later version’s significant moment, the dreamer’s desperate struggle at Moneta’s 
altar, is represented as a first-hand experience of the narrator himself. The Fall of Hyperion is 
concerned with the subjective realm of mind more explicitly than its predecessor.
　Thus, in Keats’s last epic attempt, the problem of terrestrial suffering is more fully internalised. 
By transferring the narrative of a fall, suffering and salvation into the individual psyche, this poem 
provides a further exploration of “the vale of Soul-making.”  Salvation for Keats is a personal 
matter. It can be attained by individual human consciousness when it achieves personal identity 
and becomes a soul. And this achievement is possible only by going through a process of pain 
and suffering. With this philosophy of soul-making, it would have been difficult for Keats to 
accept Erasmus Darwin’s notion of collective redemption. Individual sufferings and deaths may 
be nullified in the metaphysical system of the older poet. But this does not make any sense for the 
younger Romantic, who wishes to be a true poet “to whom the miseries of the world / Are misery, 
and will not let them rest” (Fall of Hyperion 1. 148-49).
　Both Darwin and Keats wrote poetic passages on the struggle for existence among creatures. 
Their attitudes, though, sharply differ. As my reading of The Temple of Nature and other works of 
Darwin indicates, this eighteenth-century poet seeks ultimate harmony in the metaphysical totality 
of the world. The problem of pain and mortality is specious; they are merely localised disruptions 
which ultimately contribute to the good of the whole system of nature. Keats, in contrast, is not 
content with Darwinian thinking and develops his own salvation myth in the internal realm of 
individual consciousness.
　A great deal of critical effort has gone into distinguishing literary Neo-classicism from 
Romanticism, and eighteenth-century sensibility from that of the early nineteenth century. This 
paper, by establishing Darwin’s collectivism and Keats’s individualism, may hopefully contribute 
to this critical endeavour.
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Ⅴ
　In closing, I shall briefly look at two other poets who grappled with the issue of pain and death: 
Alfred Lord Tennyson and John Clare. Tennyson, in a sense, shows an extension of Keats’s 
individualism in the Victorian age. But Clare presents a truly alternative view. As I shall suggest 
below, Clare’s stance may be closer to our present-day attitude.
　Tennyson published In Memoriam in 1850, to commemorate the death of Arthur Henry Hallam. 
The poem is the sincerest expression of Tennyson’s mourning confronted with the loss of his 
dearest friend. However, with its length extending to more than a hundred and thirty sections, this 
series of elegies becomes more than a lament for the dead; Tennyson’s philosophical inquiry into 
the meaning of life and religious salvation is developed in great detail.
　In an earlier section of the poem, Tennyson appears to be on the side of Darwin. Evil is local, and 
the totality of nature is presided over by the good will of God; like Darwin, Tennyson says, “good 
/ Will be the final goal of ill” (54. 1-2). He comes close to the belief that every death or suffering 
contributes to the whole; thus life is eventually recompensed:
  　　　　. . . not one life shall be destroy’d, 
 Or cast as rubbish to the void, 
 When God hath made the pile complete;
  That not a worm is cloven in vain; 
 That not a moth with vain desire 
 Is shrivell’d in a fruitless fire, 
 Or but subserves another’s gain. (54. 6-12)
　Yet Tennyson is ultimately unconvinced by this view; he confesses that he is drawn to a far 
more sceptical perspective: “Nature, red in tooth and claw” (56. 15). His doubt is brought on by 
contemporary science. According to the biology and geology of his day, species as well as their 
individual members were tragically liable to death and extinction. Tennyson cannot escape from the 
influence of this world-view: “. . . of fifty seeds / She [Nature] often brings but one to bear” (55. 11-
12); “She cries, ‘A thousand types are gone: I care for nothing, all shall go’” (56. 3-4). 
　The time was the mid-Victorian period, and no longer was there such metaphysical consolation 
as was available for Darwin. Departing from metaphysics, science was being re-established in 
observation and demonstration. By defining the world first as a seemingly benevolent system where 
every life is cared for, and then as a cruel order that leaves each human being struggling in anxiety 
and despair, Tennyson’s poem seems to epitomise the historical transition from Darwin’s view to 
Keats’s sensibility.
　Born in 1793, John Clare was Keats’s contemporary. A “peasant poet” rooted in the soil, he 
is exempt from transcendentalist tendencies which pervade the thinking of many Romantics. 
Composing mostly poetry of nature, he often encounters actual struggles for existence among 
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creatures. However, he does not have recourse to a metaphysical system; rather, his attitude is cool 
acceptance. I quote from Shepherd’s Calendar:
  In the barn hole sits the cat 
 Watching within the thirsty rat 
 Who oft at morn its dwelling leaves 
 To drink the moisture from the eves 
 The redbreast with his nimble eye 
 Dare scarcely stop to catch the flye 
 That tangled in the spiders snare 
 Mourns in vain for freedom there. (“September” 74-82)
As James McKusick argues, here and elsewhere Clare is aware of predator-prey relationships, 
describing them with a degree of sympathy, but without undue sentimentality; the poet is clearly 
aware of the role of predation in maintaining the balance of the ecological system of nature (83-
84). McKuisck also alludes to similarly tense interactions between young foxes and blackbirds in 
Clare’s “The Vixen” (84).
　Clare’s eye on scenes of predation is objective and secular; but his attitude is also a sympathetic 
appreciation of life in the biological sphere. His viewpoint is thus subtly different from Darwin 
and Keats, and perhaps closer to our present-day sensibility. If Clare is able to come to terms with 
“Nature, red in tooth and claw” by assuming this attitude, he may well be a significant model for 
twenty-first-century sensibilities.
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